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1. Introduction 
 
Using  a  model  with  undifferentiated  firms,  Motta  (2004,  pag.  164-165)  states  that 
collusion is easier to sustain when firms have similar market shares: symmetry helps 
collusion. The intuition is simple: since firms are undifferentiated, punishment profits 
are zero for both firms and deviation profits are also equal. Only collusion profits are 
different between firms: the firm with a larger market share has larger collusive profits. 
It follows that the smaller firm has the  greater incentive to deviate from the cartel. 
Moreover,  the  more  the  smaller  firm  is  similar  to  the  larger  firm  the  lower  is  its 
incentive to cheat.  
Things are less obvious when firms are differentiated: both punishment and deviation 
profits are different between firms, and their magnitude depends both on symmetry and 
differentiation. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of firms’ symmetry on 
the sustainability of a collusive agreement between differentiated firms. We obtain the 
following results: the smaller firm is more likely to deviate than the larger firm, and the 
sustainability  of  collusion  improves  with  symmetry  for  any  possible  differentiation 




2. The model 
 
Following Hotelling (1929), the differentiated good is represented in the product space 
Γ  which  is  the  unit  interval  ] 1 , 0 [ .  Consumers  are  uniformly  distributed  over  the 
interval. Define with  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each consumer. For a consumer positioned 
at a given point, the most preferred variety is represented by the point in which he is 
located. Each consumer consumes no more than 1 unit of the good. Define with v the 
maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay for buying his preferred variety.  
There are two firms, A and B. Fixed and marginal costs are zero. Firm A is located at 
a, while firm B is located at b. Without loss of generality, we assume  1 0 ≤ < ≤ b a . 
Define  a b k − ≡ , with  ] , 0 ( b k ∈ , as the differentiation degree between the two firms: 
the higher is k (i.e. the more the firms are distant on the segment), the more the firms are 
differentiated
2.  
Define  with  J p   the  price  charged  by  firm  B A J , = .  The  utility  of  a  consumer 
depends on v, on the price set by the firm from which he buys, and on the distance 
between his most preferred variety and the variety produced by the firm. Following 
D’Aspremont  et  al.  (1979),  we  assume  quadratic  disutility  costs.  The  utility  of  a 
consumer  located  at  x  when  he  buys  from  firm  A  is  given  by: 
                                                 
1 Of course, the market share of each firm is only one of the possible dimensions of symmetry/asymmetry 
among firms. Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) consider symmetry in capacities, and they show that the 
firm with the largest capacity has the highest incentive to deviate, and that more symmetry in capacity 
distribution helps collusion. Kuhn and Motta (1999) consider symmetry in product range: the smaller is 
the firm (i.e. the lower is the number of product varieties sold) the higher is the temptation to deviate, and 
the more the firms are similar the more collusion is easy to sustain. 
2 An alternative interpretation of the differentiation degree between the firms within the Hotelling model 
considers the transportation cost parameter. Here we follow the interpretation adopted, among the others, 
by Chang (1991, 1992), Friedman and Thisse (1993) and Hackner (1995).    2 
2 2 ) ( ) ( k b x t p v a x t p v u A A
x
A + − − − = − − − = , while his utility when he buys from firm 
B is given by: 
2 ) ( b x t p v u B
x
B − − − = . We make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 1: there is full market coverage
3.  
 
As in Shaffer and Zhang (2002), we define firms’ symmetry as a situation in which, 
all else equal, the share of the consumers that prefer firm A to firm B is equal to the 
share of the consumers that prefer firm B to firm A. This occurs when  1 = +b a  (Picture 
1.A),  which  implies  2 ) 1 ( + = k b .  When  firms  are  asymmetric,  there  are  two 
possibilities. One possibility is that, all else equal, more consumers prefer firm A to firm 
B. This occurs when  1 > +b a  (Picture 1.B), which implies:  2 ) 1 ( + > k b . The other 
possibility is that, all else equal, more consumers prefer firm B to firm A. This occurs 
when  1 < +b a  (Picture 1.C), which implies:  2 ) 1 ( + < k b . In the rest of the article we 
consider  only  the  case  in  which  firm  B  is  “larger”  than  firm  A.  Therefore, 
) 2 ) 1 ( , [ + ∈ k k b
4. Parameter b measures the firms’ symmetry. The lower is b, the more 
are  the  consumers  that,  all  else  equal,  prefer  firm  B  to  firm  A.  When  0 → b ,  all 
consumers, all else equal, prefer firm B to firm A. Instead, when  2 ) 1 ( + → k b , the 
share of the consumers preferring firm A to firm B is equal to the share of the consumers 
preferring firm B to firm A. Therefore, the higher is b the higher is symmetry
5. 
 




Suppose  that  firms  interact  repeatedly  in  an  infinite  horizon  setting.  In  supporting 
collusion, the firms are assumed to use the grim trigger strategy of Friedman (1971)
6. 
                                                 
3 Full market coverage occurs when the reservation price is sufficiently high with respect to transportation 
cost. It can be shown that  t v 4 ≥  is a sufficient condition for assumption 1 to hold. Details are available 
from the author upon request. 
4 Note that the assumptions on b and k can be written even in a compact way:  1 2 ) 1 ( 0 ≤ + < ≤ < k b k . 
5 Clearly, when firm A is the larger firm (that is, when  1 2 ) 1 ( 0 ≤ < + < b k  holds) the higher is b the 
lower is symmetry.  
6 The grim trigger strategy implies that firms start by charging the collusive price. The firms continue to 
set the collusive price until one firm has deviated from the collusive agreement in the previous period. If a   3 
Define 
C
J Π , 
D
J Π   and 
N
J Π ,  with  B A J , = ,  respectively  as  the  one-shot  collusive, 
deviation and punishment (or Nash) profits of each firm. The market discount factor, δ , 
is exogenous and common for each firm. It is well known that collusion is sustainable 
as  a  sub-game  perfect  equilibrium  if  and  only  if:  ] , max[ * B A δ δ δ δ = ≥ ,  where 








J J Π − Π Π − Π ≡ δ ,  with  B A J , = .  Therefore,  * δ   measures  the  cartel 
sustainability:  the  higher  is  * δ   the  smaller  is  the  set  of  market  discount  factors 
supporting collusion (i.e. collusion is less sustainable), and vice-versa. 
 
3. Sustainability of collusion 
 
The punishment stage. The punishment price is the Nash-equilibrium price of the one-
shot base game. Define with 
N
A p  and 
N
B p  respectively the price set by firm A and by 
firm B. Define with  x the indifferent consumer (i.e. the consumer that receives the 
same utility buying from firm A or from firm B). By equating 
x
A u  and 
x
B u  and solving 




B − + − = .  Since  consumers  are  uniformly 
distributed, the demand of firm A is  x, while the demand of firm B is  x − 1 . The profit 
function of firm A is therefore  x p
N
A , while the profit function of firm B is  ) 1 ( x p
N
B − . 
Each  firm  maximizes  its  profits  taking  the  rival’s  price  as  given.  Straightforward 
calculations  yield  the  following  Nash-equilibrium  prices:  3 ) 2 2 ( * k b tk p
N
A − + =  
and 3 ) 2 4 ( * k b tk p
N
B + − = . By substituting the equilibrium prices in the profit functions, 
we obtain the punishment profits:  
 
                                                        18 ) 2 2 (
2 k b tk
N
A − + = Π                                       (1) 
                                                        18 ) 2 4 (
2 k b tk
N
B + − = Π                                       (2) 
 
Before  proceeding,  note  that  firm  A  (B)  has  lower  (higher)  profits.  Moreover, 
punishment profits of firm A (B) increase (decrease) with b. Therefore, the higher is 
symmetry the lower is the difference between the punishment profits.  
 
The collusive stage. It is not obvious how to define collusive pricing in an asymmetric 
game. Here we follow Hackner (1994) and assume that firms collude on the uniform 
price which maximizes joint profits
7. Define with  x ˆ  the consumer paying the highest 
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firm deviates at time t, from  1 + t  onward both firms play the equilibrium price emerging in the non-
cooperative constituent game. 
7  The  main  attractiveness  of  this  collusive  agreement  is  its  simplicity:  if  one  accepts  the  idea  that 
colluding firms cannot enforce very complex collusive agreement, the collusive contract we assume is 
rational.  For  other  possible  “ad  hoc”  collusive  contracts  between  asymmetric  firms  see  for  instance 
Friedman and Thisse (1993). 
8 Except if otherwise mentioned, proofs are relegated to the appendix.   4 
Define  { } 1 ˆ ) , (
1 = ≡ x k b S  and  { } 2 ˆ ) , (
2 k b x k b S − = ≡ . The collusive price results from 
the indifference condition:  0 ) ˆ (
2 = − − − b x t p v
C . Solving with respect to 
C p  and using 
Lemma 1, it follows: 
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Let define  x ( as the indifferent consumer when the two firms set 
C p . By equating 
x
A u  
and 
x
B u   and  solving  for  x,  we  get:  2 k b x − = ( .  Given  the  uniform  distribution 
assumption, the demand of A is  x (, while the demand of B is  x ( − 1 . Therefore, the 
collusive profits of each firm are: 
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                    (5) 
 
Note that firm A obtains lower collusive profits than firm B. Moreover, collusive profits 
of firm A (firm B) are increasing (decreasing) with b
9. 
 
The deviation stage. The deviating firm lowers its price in order to steal the rival’s 
consumers. Define 
D
J p  as the deviation price of firm  B A J , = . Suppose for the moment 
that the deviating firm serves the whole market. Therefore, the deviating firm lowers its 
price until the consumer disliking its variety the most is indifferent between the firms. If 
the cheating firm is A, it sets the highest price which makes the consumer located at 1 
indifferent  between  buying  from  it  or  from  firm  B.  The  indifference  condition  is 
therefore:  
 
                                             
2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( b t p v k b t p v
C D
A − − − = + − − −                         (6) 
 
Substituting (3) into (6) and solving for 
D
A p  we get:  
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        (7) 
 
If the cheating firm is B, it sets the highest price which makes the consumer located at 0 
indifferent between buying from it or from firm A. The indifference condition is:  
 
                                                     
2 2 ) ( tb p v k b t p v
D
B
C − − = − − −                             (8) 
                                                 
9 It can be easily verified that both firms benefit from the collusive agreement, since collusive profits are 
higher than the Nash profits.   5 
 
Substituting (3) into (8) and solving for 
D
B p   we get:  
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                 (9) 
 
Differentiation of the deviation profits of firm A with respect to b shows that deviation 
profits increase with symmetry. The opposite is true for firm B. Moreover, firm A has 
lower deviation profits than firm B (details are omitted). 
The following lemma states that it is never optimal for the cheating firm to steal only a 
fraction of the competitor’s customers.  
 
Lemma 2: the deviating firm serves the whole market. 
 
The critical discount factor. Inserting (1), (4) and (7) into A δ  and (2), (5) and (9) into B δ , 
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We have that: 
 
Proposition 1:  B A δ δ >  and  A δ  is continuous and decreasing in b
10.  
 
Therefore, the critical discount factor coincides with the one of the smaller firm and 
symmetry helps collusion. These results extend Motta (2004) analysis to the case of 
differentiated firms: even if punishment profits and deviation profits are increasing with 
symmetry, the increase of the collusive profits induced by higher similarity among firms 




                                                 
10 The proof of the first part of proposition 1 is simply a comparison between  A δ  and  B δ . In order to 
prove that  A δ  is a continuous function is sufficient to substitute  2 1 k b − = and verify that two parts of 
the equation coincide. In order to verify that  A δ  is decreasing in b it is sufficient to verify that the 
derivative with respect to b is always negative. All calculations are made in Mathematica and available on 
request from the author.    6 
Appendix 
 
Lemma 1. There are three candidates for being the consumer which pays the highest 
transportation costs:  0 = x  (the most to the left consumer),  1 = x  (the most to the right 
consumer) and  2 k b x − =  (the consumer located halfway from the two firms). First, 
note that the farthest consumer can never be the consumer located at 0. Such consumer 
buys from firm A and pays transportation costs equal to 
2 ) ( k b t − , while the consumer 
located  at  1  and  buying  from  firm  B  pays 
2 ) 1 ( − b t ,  which  is  always  larger  than 
2 ) ( k b t − .  It remains to compare the transportation costs of the consumer located at 
2 k b − ,  4
2 tk , with the transportation costs of the consumer located at 1, 
2 ) 1 ( − b t . 
Therefore,  for  2 k b x − =   to  be  the  consumer  suffering  the  higher  disutility  the 
following  inequality  must  by  verified: 
2 2 ) 1 ( 4 − ≥ b t tk .  The  right-hand  side  is 
decreasing in b, and has its maximum in  k b = . Substituting and solving with respect to 
k, it is immediate to note that the inequality is always verified when  3 2 > k . The right-
hand side has its minimum in  2 ) 1 ( + = k b . Substituting and solving with respect to k, it 
is  easy  to  note  that  the  inequality  is  never  verified  when  2 1 ≤ k .  For  intermediate 
values of k, we solve the inequality with respect to b, and we obtain that it is verified 
when  2 1 2 1 k b k + ≤ ≤ −  (clearly, the second inequality is always satisfied). 
  
Lemma 2. Consider first firm A. The most at the right consumer served by firm A comes 
from the indifference condition: 
2 2 , ) ( ) ( b x t p v k b x t p v
C f D




indicates  that  the  deviating  firm  serves  only  a  fraction  of  the  market.  Solving  with 
respect to x it follows:  2 ) 2 ( 2 ) ( *
, k b tk p p x
f D
A




A . Maximizing the profit function with respect to the price, we obtain: 
2 ) 2 ( 2 *
, k b tk p p
C f D
A − + = . Substituting equation (3) into  *
, f D
A p  we obtain:           
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A p p ≤ *
, , it is better for firm A to serve the whole market. We have: 
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A p p − *
,  is decreasing in v.  By substituting  t v 4 =  (see footnote 3) into 
equation (11) we get: 
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   7 
From  the  assumptions  on  b  and  k  it  follows  immediately  that  0 ) 2 ( < − b b , 
0 ) 2 ( < − b k k ,  0 1< − k   and  0 ) 8 5 ( < − b k k .  Moreover, 
1 ) , ( S k b ∈   implies  3 2 ≤ k , 
which in turn implies  0 3 4 < − k . It follows that equation (12) is negative: therefore the 
deviating firm serves the whole market. 
Suppose now that the deviating firm is B. The most at the left consumer served by firm 
B  is  the  solution  with  respect  to  x  of  the  following  indifference  condition: 
2 , 2 ) ( ) ( b x t p v k b x t p v
f D
B
C − − − = + − − − .  Then,  2 ) 2 ( 2 ) ( *
, k b tk p p x
C f D
B − + − = . 
The profit function of firm B is:  *) 1 (
, x p
f D
B − . Maximizing with respect to the price, we 
get:  2 2 ) 2 2 ( *
, C f D
B p k b tk p + + − = . Substituting (3) into  *
, f D
B p , we get: 
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B p p ≤ *
, , it is better for firm B to serve the whole market. We have: 
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B p p − *
,  is decreasing in v. By substituting  t v 4 =  into equation (14) we get: 
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From the assumptions on b and k it is immediate to see that all terms in equation (15) 
are negative. This implies that the deviating firm serves the whole market. 
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